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Abstract To assess the likely economic outcomes to fishing fleets of the Landing
Obligation (LO), bioeconomic models covering seven European fisheries, ranging
from the North East Atlantic to the Mediterranean, have been applied to estimate the
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economic performance of fleets before and after implementing the LO. It is shown
that for most of the analysed fisheries, their economic outcome will be negatively
affected in the long term by the LO, when compared to the expected outcome with
no LO. Efficient mitigation strategies (exemptions, quota uplifts, improved selectiv-
ity, effort reallocation and others) may, for some of the analysed fisheries, reduce the
negative economic effect of the LO. Moreover, the possibility to trade quotas, both
nationally and internationally, may also reduce the economic losses caused by the
LO. However, even with mitigation strategies and/or quota trade in place, most of
the analysed fisheries are worse off under the LO than what could be expected if the
LO was not implemented.
Keywords Costs and earnings · Discards · Economic repercussions · Fisheries
management · Fleet adjustment
6.1 Introduction
Commercial fisheries in Europe are diverse, with fish being caught for varied
purposes ranging from high-value species for human consumption to fish used for
fishmeal and fish oil. Technological and biological interactions make it difficult to
catch target species completely selectively. For almost a century, landings of imma-
ture fish have been prohibited by regulations. Discarding fish below a minimum
conservation reference size (MCRS) has been mandatory in European waters since
the adoption of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983. The CFP Landing
Obligation (LO) of 2013 requires fish under the MCRS to be landed, with imple-
mentation being phased in from 2015 to 2019. Similarly, before 2013, it was
forbidden to land species for which quota was exhausted, and discarding of catches
at or above MCRS was therefore required, a logical practice in mixed species
fisheries.
Many businesses expect significant short-term negative economic repercussions
of the LO due to increased operating costs, decreased income from landings and
underutilisation of quotas (Condie et al. 2014). However, the actual outcomes of the
LO will depend on several factors, including (i) the management system in place,
(ii) application of exemptions (e.g. de minimis allowance of discards up to 5%), (iii)
interannual transfers, (iv) catch allowances of stocks without TACs, (v) quota
adjustments and quota swaps/movements, (vi) application of selectivity measures,
(vii) costs of landing unwanted catch, (viii) prices obtained for unwanted fish and
(ix) compliance of the sector. It is hoped that short-term losses could be mitigated by
longer-term gains, given the desired reduced pressure on fish stocks and anticipated
increases in quota and catch rates.
This chapter considers economic outcomes for fleets by analysing possible
economic effects of the LO for seven diverse European case studies comprising
(i) UK and Danish North Sea demersal fisheries, (ii) the French demersal trawl
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fishery in the Eastern English Channel, (iii) the Spanish trawl fishery in the Bay of
Biscay, (iv) the Spanish trawl fishery in the Cantabrian-NW region, (v) the Greek
trawl and small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean)
and (vi) the Spanish demersal trawl fishery in the Western Mediterranean. Common
for all these fleets is that they have a history of substantial unwanted catches before
the LO; therefore it can be expected that the LO would affect them substantially.
6.2 What Can the Literature of Economics Tell Us?
The literature tells us that fishers tend to use more fishing effort than socially optimal
due to market failures such as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). An
unregulated, open-access fishery leads to overexploitation of fish resources; there-
fore the EU has attempted to prevent this by use of total allowable catches (TACs),
limited fishing effort, MCRS and technical specifications for fishing gears, closed
areas and seasons, among other measures. However, in mixed fisheries, these
restrictions may also, in some cases, encourage a ‘race to fish’ and may increase
incentives to discard because low quotas of some species prevent full exploitation of
species with higher quotas. Quotas may also increase incentives to high-grade
(discard lower-value fish) to maximise profit.
Although the CFP has a common approach to managing the fishing opportunities
of the European Union including rules of compulsory discard, the management and
organisation of fleets differ between Member States. Therefore, the economic
repercussions of the LO not only depend on the rules of the LO but also on the
national management system to which fishing businesses are subjected.
When interest for the discard issue arose in the 1990s, four general types of
factors that encouraged discarding were identified (FAO 1996b; Nordic Council of
Ministers 2003): (i) institutional, e.g. management measures such as quotas, effort
restrictions, minimum landing size of fish and mesh size regulations; (ii) biological,
e.g. species interaction and characteristics of the fish (e.g. gender, and size); (iii)
technological such as gear selectivity (e.g. prohibited gear, damage to fish); and
(iv) economic, for example, price and cost relationships determined on the market
and high-grading (discarding low-value fish, both regulated and unregulated) to
maximise profit by using quota and room on-board for more valuable fish (Batsleer
et al. 2015).
Discarding originates primarily from non-selective catch and high-grading prac-
tices. These form the basis for the empirical and theoretical economic research that
has been done regarding discarding over the last 20 years.
This research began in the 1990s (e.g. Flaaten and Larsen 1991; Frost 1996;
Christensen 1996; Pascoe and Revill 2004). Empirical approaches also appeared in
conferences and research programmes (FAO 1996a, b; Clucas 1997). In the FAO
context, the economics of discarding can be found in Pascoe (1997) with an update
in Kelleher (2005). The Nordic Council of Ministers (2003) investigated incentives
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to discard and options to reduce it. An EU Framework 7 project, NECESSITY,
investigated options to reduce discarding by using increased mesh sizes or panels in
fishing gear (Frost et al. 2007).
Alongside empirical research, theoretical work based on socio-economic model-
ling has developed. One approach concerns unwanted catch in open-access and
individual transferable quota (ITQ)-managed fisheries (Ward 1994; Ward et al.
2012; Boyce 1996; Turner 1996, 1997). These analyses usually include two species
(target and nontarget) and two fleets and deal with the optimal use and allocation of
effort subject to a profit- (or resource rent-) maximising objective. In this context,
bycatches of nontarget species constitute an endogenous externality, i.e. an outside
impact influenced by fishers. In a simple situation where harvest of the target and
nontarget species is in fixed proportions, fishing effort used to harvest target species
can simply be scaled up and down to reach a first-best optimum. However, harvest of
target and nontarget species may take place in variable proportions. Boyce (1996)
compares maximisation of welfare in situations governed by open access and ITQs
of harvesting two such species by two fleets. He finds that open access leads to
excessive bycatches and that an ITQ system can only secure a first-best optimum if
imposed on both target species and bycatches. Segerson (2007) extends this analysis
to include stochastic bycatches and shows that neither landing fees nor ITQs on both
target species and bycatches can secure an expected first-best optimum in which all
market failures are corrected in an economically optimal way. A different approach
to analyse bycatches is adopted in Abbott and Wilen (2009) where actual regulation,
as opposed to estimated economically optimal regulation, is introduced. A given
fishery is regulated with quotas for both target and nontarget species combined with
limited entry programmes, and this actual regulation generates excessive bycatches
and too short harvest seasons.
Another theoretical approach deals with high-grading. High-grading may occur
for several reasons, e.g. to extend a quota that is nearly exhausted, to get the best
value per tonne of quota or to make room on-board the vessel for more valuable fish.
Arnason (1994) and Anderson (1994) show that a traditional ITQ system strengthens
the incentive to high-grade. However, Turner (1997) shows that a value-based ITQ
system (quotas measured in value instead of volume) secures a welfare optimal level
of high-grading in a similar way that open access does. Under open-access or effort
management, the distance between fishing grounds and ports of landing affects
vessel operators’ decisions about catching patterns; limited hold or processing
capacity may be increased in the short term for high-priced fish through discarding
of low-priced fish, and this discarding can thus pay for one or two more hauls per trip
(turnaround cost) (see Vestergaard 1996). In the market policy of the CFP, the
suppression of withdrawal prices in 2014 also constituted an incentive to discard,
as the removal of a fixed minimum price increases the economic propensity to
discard.
Analysing high-grading requires the inclusion of high- and low-priced fish. This
can be done by including age-structured fish stocks in the model or simply dividing
the stock in two parts: a low-priced and a high-priced part.
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Fish sales prices relative to fishing costs also influence the incentives to discard: if
the price of fish is lower than the costs of putting the fish on the market, then the fish
should be discarded – at least from an economic point of view. However, it may pay
to land fish even when handling costs are higher than the total value. That is, if costs
of discarding are higher than the loss likely to be incurred by putting the fish on the
market, then the fish should be landed.
When it is illegal to discard fish while incentives to discard remain, monitoring
and control must be effectively invoked to offset incentives to discard (Sutinen and
Andersen 1985; Nuevo et al., this volume). Also, social norms, trust and cooperation
play a role (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume). When it is
difficult to monitor vessel operations at sea, vessel operators may decide not to
comply with regulation. Jensen and Vestergaard (2002) consider discarding in a
moral hazard context, i.e. when fishers hide their actions at sea; when these actions
cannot be detected, repercussions are placed on them based on common elements
such as estimated changes in target fish stocks.
To discourage non-compliance, measures are required to assist enforcement,
including penalties, incentives to adapt to social norms, increased acceptance of
management rules (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kraak and Hart, this volume) and a
governance structure which addresses diverging perceptions about the legitimacy of
discarding in the first place (Fitzpatrick et al., this volume; van Hoof et al., this
volume). In theory, a premium can be introduced, e.g. an increase in the price of fish
that would otherwise be discarded because of a low price. It could also be invoked as
a penalty placed on the (estimated) net benefit from discarding. In such a case, the
vessel operator will include the benefit/penalty in their decision function. However,
he/she will also consider the probability of being detected and the likelihood and size
of any fine. If the risk of being detected and the penalty are low, fish will probably be
discarded and vice versa.
6.3 The European Case Study Fisheries
Possible economic implications of the LO are presented through seven diverse
European fishery case studies. Characteristics of each case are summarised in
Table 6.1. Cases are divided into three groups: (i) demersal fisheries in the North
Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel, represented by fleets from Denmark, the
UK and France, (ii) Spanish Atlantic fisheries represented by the Basque mixed
demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay and the Galician trawl fleet in the Cantabrian-
NW region and (iii) Mediterranean fisheries represented by two mixed demersal
trawl fisheries from the Balearic Islands (Spain, Western Mediterranean) and the
Greek trawl and small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf (Eastern
Mediterranean).
All cases have different management systems on top of which the LO is imposed.
However, all have a certain degree of MCRS regulation, and before the LO, it was
compulsory to discard fish below MCRS, with a few derogations in certain pelagic
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Table 6.1 Base characteristics of the European case study fisheries with respect to the type of
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fisheries. Under the LO, it has become obligatory to land these fish, but they cannot
be sold for human consumption. On top of this new obligation to land small fish, the
North Sea, West of Scotland and English Channel fisheries are regulated by TACs,
in some cases combined with effort regulation and technical conservation measures.
While TACs are set at the European level, national quotas (i.e. fixed shares of the
TACs) are managed differently by the Member States. They are managed as ITQs in


























































































































6 Potential Economic Consequences of the Landing Obligation 115
in the UK in a system that is essentially a quasi-ITQ system and are distributed
between POs in France. Swaps and quota exchanges are allowed between organisa-
tions in the UK and France. The Atlantic Spanish fisheries are regulated with Total
Allowable Effort (Prellezo et al. 2016) and TACs. The Mediterranean fisheries are
regulated through technical gear specifications and MCRS for the main target
species, temporal and spatial closures and other technical measures (Stergiou et al.
2016).
Demersal fishing activities in the North Sea, West of Scotland and in the English
Channel have highly mixed catches of species, and therefore it is not possible to fully
catch all quotas at the same time in the year, leading to either underutilisation of
quota or discarding of fish for which quotas are exhausted first. Under the LO, the
risk of a choke situation, i.e. having to stop fishing when the quota of a low-quota
stock is exhausted, is a great concern to managers and vessel operators alike (Ulrich
et al. 2011). This is especially expected to be a problem for French vessels, operating
with fixed quota shares within producer/fishery organisations, while this problem
may be less severe for UK and Danish fleets, where quota trade may mitigate the
problem to some extent. For Spanish demersal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay,
mackerel and horse mackerel are discarded because of low-quota allocations,
i.e. to optimise quota utilisation of other species, while hake is primarily discarded
because of being below MCRS. Thus, in these fisheries choke situations may also be
an issue. In the Mediterranean fisheries, discarding is primarily due to fish below
MCRS and to high-grading. As such, all cases face lower revenues under the LO
given that previously discarded fish of low value and below MCRS must now be
landed, combined with increased handling costs of these unwanted catches.
6.3.1 Mitigation Strategies
Given the different challenges that the selected fishing fleets face under the LO,
different scenarios have been analysed, mainly addressing (i) how fleets will respond
given the threats faced and (ii) how economic losses can be reduced through
mitigation strategies most relevant for that fleet. Table 6.2 gives an outline of the
scenarios analysed for each case study.
In all case studies, the economic situation was analysed for the fleet, given the
current management system (cf. Table 6.1), i.e. if the LO had not been implemented
(named ‘business as usual’). This scenario is used as a first benchmark when
analysing the effects of the LO. In all case studies the full implementation of the
LO with no exemptions was also analysed, i.e. the economic situation for the fleets
given their current management system with the LO superimposed. This is a second
benchmark against which the effects of introducing mitigation strategies are com-
pared. Application of full implementation in the case study models was based on
different assumptions for each case study:
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• In the Danish North Sea demersal case, fish below MCRS must be landed, with
gradual implementation from 2016 to 2019 depending on species.
• In the UK mixed demersal fleets, each vessel in a PO has its initial quota
available, and by 2019 no demersal species below MCRS can be discarded.
The LO is implemented gradually towards 2019 depending on the fish stock.
• In the French mixed demersal case, vessels in métiers are forbidden to continue
fishing as soon as the quota of one of their target stocks is reached, and fishing
effort is then allocated between the remaining métiers. Fish under MCRS are
landed but cannot be sold (price set to zero).
• In the Bay of Biscay Basque mixed demersal trawl case, the fishing activity of a
given métier is stopped when the most binding quota share is reached.
Table 6.2 Scenarios analysed for the European case study fisheries


































Notes: 1Quota adjustments assumed in all LO scenarios for the Bay of Biscay
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between fleets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efficient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
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• In the Galician mixed trawl case, all catches of species subject to TACs or MCRS
must be landed.
• In both Mediterranean cases, a 10% increase in daily variable costs and one more
crew member on-board are assumed to reflect the extra effort needed to bring
ashore unwanted catches. Three full implementation scenarios were examined for
the Greek case (Eastern Mediterranean) based on varying discard rates: (i) 5%
increase of daily costs, no extra crew member; (ii) 10% increase of daily costs,
10% extra crew (the original full implementation scenario); and (iii) 20% increase
of daily costs, 20% extra crew (based on the discard rates reported in the
literature). The reason for the extra full implementation scenarios was that,
according to official reports (DCF 2016), the percentage of hake and red mullet
discards in Greece had dropped to less than 5% since 2013; thus, this case differs
substantially from initial estimates that were based on the literature
(e.g. Tsagarakis et al. (2014)).
The analysed mitigation strategies (see Table 6.2) are different for each case,
reflecting the specific challenges each fleet faces when the LO is introduced.
In the UK, Danish and French cases, the focus is on maximising quota utilisation.
For the Danish demersal fishery, the effect of introducing a 5% de minimis exemp-
tion is analysed. In addition, economic effects of lowering the MCRS for cod
(making it possible to sell some fraction of cod below the previous MCRS) are
analysed. For the UK North Sea and West of Scotland mixed demersal fleets, a
number of mitigation strategies are analysed: (i) allowance for catching and landing
species with zero TAC; (ii) as scenario (i) but with quota adjustment to all TAC
species; (iii) as scenario (ii) but with the possibility to reallocate effort to other areas
of operation to better utilise producer organisation (PO) quota; (iv) as scenario (iii)
but with quota reallocation allowed within the UK to maximise use of quotas; and
(v) as scenario (iv) but with international and national swaps at the level of the
baseline year incorporated and UK end of year quota reallocated to PO fleets in need
of quota. The French mixed demersal fishery in the English Channel case focused on
(i) quota adjustments for sole, plaice, cod and whiting and (ii) assuming that fishers
can shift to fish in other areas.
The choke situation and having to land fish below MCRS are also issues in the
Spanish Atlantic cases. Thus the focus is on quota utilisation optimisation and on
fishing gear selectivity. For the Spanish Bay of Biscay mixed demersal fishery, the
focus is on investigating the economic effects of implementing (i) 5% de minimis
exemption, (ii) inter-year quota flexibility, (iii) combining de minimis and inter-year
flexibility and (iv) selectivity changes for the pair trawlers, given the single-species
nature of their catches (90% hake), assuming a change in minimum mesh size from
100 mm to 120 mm. For the Spanish demersal trawl fishery in the Cantabrian-NW
region, the focus is on (i) 5% de minimis exemption and (ii) effects of improved
selectivity, e.g. through effort reallocation or non-compliance, assuming this will
reduce unwanted catches by 50%.
The two Mediterranean cases focus predominantly on selectivity issues, given
their high catches of unwanted species and fish below MCRS. For the Spanish
demersal trawl fishery around the Balearic Islands (Western Mediterranean), several
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selectivity possibilities for hake are analysed: (i) no fishing mortality for hake at age
0, (ii) no fishing mortality of hake below MCRS (by decreasing the fishing mortality
of age 1 individuals by 10%) and (iii) no fishing mortality of immature individuals
(through modification of age-selectivity parameters).
For the Greek demersal trawl and small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos
Gulf (Eastern Mediterranean), three selectivity scenarios are applied to both hake
and red mullet: (i) no fishing mortality at age 0, (ii) no fishing mortality below
MCRS (by additionally decreasing the fishing mortality of age 1 individuals by
10%) and (iii) no fishing mortality for hake and red mullet at ages 0 and 1 through
modification of age-selectivity parameters.
6.3.2 The Model Tools
The analyses were done using different bioeconomic models constructed for the
geographical areas of the case study fleets (Table 6.3). Given the level of detail and
complexity of each model, model descriptions are not provided in this chapter but
can be found in the references listed in Table 6.3. All but one of the models are
dynamic, evaluating the development of fleet capacity, economic performance and
effort, together with stock dynamics, during the period 2015–2025. The exception is
the analysis of the Spanish trawl fishery in the Cantabrian-NW region, which is
based on input-output models.
6.4 Results
Analyses of the economic consequences of implementing the LO include two parts,
firstly the economic outcome under the LO relative to the outcome if the LO had not
been introduced and secondly the LO mitigation scenarios benchmarked against the
LO scenario with no exemptions or other mitigation strategies included. These
results differ depending on whether they are evaluated in the short or long term.
Short term is defined as a period in which only variable inputs can change (e.g. fuel
and crew) but not fixed inputs such as vessels, equipment and gear, while in the long
term, all inputs can change.
Generally, some short-term negative economic effects of the LO can be expected.
The main reasons for this are (i) the choke species issue for fisheries regulated with
quotas, whereby catch of some species is constrained once catch of another species
has reached its total quota, (ii) that landing of unwanted fish below MCRS and of
low market value will replace landings above MCRS and of high value and (iii) the
higher costs created by landing instead of discarding. The scale of these short-term
losses is case-specific. In the long term, choke situations and displacement of vessels
to other areas are expected to reduce fishing pressure, leading to biomass increases
and thus improved fishing possibilities. However, ensuing economic improvements
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will differ for individual fleet segments and vessel businesses, depending on catch
composition and on whether TACs increase proportionally when biomasses
increase. If the latter is not the case, the choke situation may be enhanced.
Here we present a single year view of the economic outcome of the LO for the
considered fisheries in 2025 assuming that the LO has been fully implemented
(Table 6.4). The exception to this is the Cantabrian-NW case that represents a static
view of the impact of the LO in an average year (based on 2014–2016) in the
Table 6.3 Model tools applied to evaluate the consequences of the LO for European case fisheries
Fishery Model
North Sea, West of Scot-
land, Eastern English
channel: Mixed demersal
Danish North Sea demersal
fishery
Fishrent: A bioeconomic profit
maximisation model integrating,
and allowing feedback between, the
economy and the biology of the
fishery (Frost et al. 2013)
UK mixed demersal fisher-
ies in the North Sea, West of
Scotland and area 7
SEAFISH: Based on the Fishrent
structure, the SEAFISH simulation
model is developed to analyse the
activity of the total UK fleet (Mardle
et al. 2017)
French demersal fishery in
the Eastern English Channel
ISIS-Fish: A spatialised operational
simulation model which simulates
the dynamics of fish populations
and fleets of the mixed fisheries in
the Eastern Channel (Pelletier et al.
2009; Lehuta et al. 2015)
Mediterranean Spanish demersal fishery in
the Western Mediterranean
MEFISTO (Mediterranean Fisher-
ies Simulation Tool): A
bioeconomic fisheries simulation
model with an age-structured bio-
logical component (Lleonart et al.
2003, https://mefisto2017.
wordpress.com/)
Greek demersal fishery in
the Thermaikos Gulf (East-
ern Mediterranean)
Spanish Atlantic fisheries Spanish mixed demersal
trawl fishery in the Bay of
Biscay
FLBEIA: A management strategy
evaluation model coupling eco-
nomic, biological and social
dimensions; it shares economic
structure with Fishrent but with an
age-structured biological compo-
nent (Garcia et al. 2017)
Spanish demersal trawl fish-
ery in the Cantabrian-NW
region
Input-output analysis: Based on
input-output tables for the Galician
Fishing and Preserved Fish Sectors
2011 (García-Negro et al. 2016), the
function of production of the fleet
was recalculated considering the LO
and the biological data obtained
from IEO (Spanish Institute of
Oceanography) campaigns
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scenarios considering full implementation and de minimis, while the scenario con-
sidering flexibility is a longer-term view, assuming a 50% reduction of catches in the
long term given improved effort reallocation or other means. Whether 2025 corre-
sponds to a long term will, to some degree, depend on the specific case study, i.e. on
whether adjustments are ongoing in the given fleet or whether equilibrium is
reached. Theoretically, a better measure of impacts would have been the net present
Table 6.4 This table displays the economic outcomes in 2025 for the LO scenarios relative to the
scenario assuming no LO (business as usual)
Mitigation
measures3
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For most scenarios the economic outcome is measured as the total profit in 2025 for the included
fleets, while for the UK and French cases, the economic outcome is measured in total revenue for
the included fleets. Results at a glance: total economic result (profit¼‘P’, revenue¼‘R’) in 2025
with LO implemented relative to the business-as-usual case (no LO)
Note: 1For the Spanish Cantabrian-NW case, the results represent the expected outcome in 2017
given the assumed scenario
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between fleets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efficient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
3Yellow indicates less than 5% change, red indicates more than 5% decrease and green indicates
more than 5% increase
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value (NPV) covering the whole period from 2015 to 2025. However, not all models
included in the present synthesis are able to provide NPVs over that period, and it has
therefore been chosen to present the outcomes for 2025 alone.
In 2025, four of the seven case studies are expected to be negatively affected by
the LO, when no exemptions are assumed (see Table 6.4). The exceptions are the
Danish North Sea demersal fleet, the Spanish Bay of Biscay fleet and the Eastern
Mediterranean fleet. The reasons for the expected economic losses are increased
daily and crew costs (Western Mediterranean case), the industry being unable to
process the previously discarded fish, and lost landings value due to cessation of
fishing after choke situations (the UK and French cases). The assumption of constant
TACs in the French case probably exacerbates the problems and results in overly
pessimistic scenarios. For the Danish case, where choking on low-quota stocks is the
greatest concern, possible negative economic consequences of the LO are reduced
through (i) quota trade under the ITQ system in place and (ii) seasonal effort
flexibility. In the Spanish mixed demersal fleet in the Bay of Biscay, possible
economic losses are reduced by the effects of choke situations reducing mortality
and increasing stock size, i.e. under full implementation of the LO, other fleets face
choke situations and cease fishing before catching quotas of other stocks, such that
the target species stock size increases in the long term, thus increasing catch
possibilities (Prellezo et al. 2016). In the Eastern Mediterranean case study, the
percentage of discards for hake and red mullet that are officially reported is below
5% for trawlers and even lower for netters (DCF 2016). For that reason, the full LO
implementation scenario will result in very low increase (< 5%) in the daily costs and
will not necessarily require an extra crew member to handle the extra catch.
Compared with how the case study fisheries would have evolved without the LO,
the LO implemented with mitigation measures is, in some cases, expected to make
the fisheries equally or better off in 2025. This is so for the Danish North Sea
demersal fishery, as the ITQ management system makes it possible for the fleets
involved to avoid choke situations through quota trade and seasonal effort flexibility.
For the Spanish demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay, interannual quota flexibility
(with a limit of 10% of the initial quota) and increased selectivity (assuming an
increase in minimum mesh size from 100 mm to 120 mm) also limit the possible
negative economic effects of the LO. However, the application of the de minimis
exemption has a negative effect in the long term. The application of the de minimis
exemption increases the fishing mortalities compared to the case with no LO and the
harvest control rule will then reduce the advised TAC for the next year (which then
happens every year). Thus, the penalty imposed, given increased fishing mortalities,
is higher than the flexibility gained by the exemption itself.
Increased selectivity also makes the fishery better off for the Spanish fishery
around the Balearic Islands (Western Mediterranean) and for the Greek trawl and
small-scale coastal fishery in the Thermaikos Gulf, especially if the catch of imma-
ture hake individuals is totally avoided, which raises the profit in 2025 above what
could be expected without the LO.
At a glance Table 6.4 shows that for most of the analysed fisheries, their
economic outcome will be negatively affected in the long term by the LO. But the
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possibility to trade quotas, both nationally and internationally, and for some fleets
increased selectivity and/or year-transfers may mitigate this effect.
Under the LO, a key question is to what degree the overall negative economic
outcome can be avoided through appropriate mitigation measures. Table 6.5 shows
the economic outcome in 2025 in the mitigation strategy scenarios for each of the
analysed fisheries, relative to the expected situation in 2025, assuming full imple-
mentation of the LO with no exemptions.
Half of the mitigation strategies analysed do not significantly improve the eco-
nomic outcome relative to full implementation of the LO with no exemptions (see
Table 6.5). This is the case for the Spanish trawl fishery in the Bay of Biscay when
Table 6.5 Results at a glance: total economic result (profit¼‘P’, revenue¼‘R’) in 2025 with
mitigations relative to full implementation of the LO with no mitigations
Mitigation
measures3









































Note: 1For the Spanish Cantabrian-NW case, the results represent the expected outcome in 2017
given the assumed scenario
2Effort reallocation can be seasonal and between fleets (the Danish case) and spatially (the French
case) or more efficient effort use (the Cantabrian-NW case)
3Yellow indicates less than 5% change, red indicates more than 5% decrease and green indicates
more than 5% increase
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inter-year quota transfers and increased mesh size selectivity are introduced. Like-
wise, the de minimis exemption in the Spanish fishery in the Cantabrian-NW region
does not lead to an increased economic result compared to when no exemptions are
applied. In parallel with this, applying the de minimis exemption leads to a reduced
economic result for the Spanish demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay, because
increased fishing pressure leads to higher mortality and reduced hake and megrim
stocks and thus reduced fishing possibilities. Likewise, for the French fishery in the
Eastern English Channel, applying increased flexibility through spatial effort
reallocation leads to a decreased economic result compared to the LO with no
mitigation strategies.
Mitigation strategies that do increase the economic outcome relative to the full
implementation of the LO with no exemptions are (i) quota adjustments in the
French demersal fishery in the Eastern English Channel, (ii) more efficient effort
use leading to reduced unwanted catches in the Spanish fishery in the Cantabrian-
NW region, (iii) increased selectivity in the Spanish fishery around the Balearic
Islands (Western Mediterranean) and (iv) all mitigation strategies (quota adjustment,
catch allowance for zero TAC stocks, vessel movements between metiers and quota
swaps) considered for the UK fishing fleets, but the scale of changes depend on the
fishing fleets concerned (North Sea and West of Scotland).
Thus, at a glance, Table 6.5 shows that for the analysed fisheries, the most
effective mitigation strategies depend on both the fishing fleet and the management
system in place. Model structure and the assumptions applied in the models may also
influence the results, but all models have been calibrated and tested against the actual
situation in each case study. It is thus believed that the relative results provided in
each case study are good indicators of the effects of the LO and applied mitigation
strategies.
6.5 Summary and Policy Recommendations
To assess the likely fleet economic repercussions of the Landing Obligation,
bioeconomic models covering seven European fisheries have been applied to esti-
mate the economic performance of fleets before and after implementing the LO. The
selected fisheries cover different species compositions and fishing technologies and
different management systems ranging from the North East Atlantic to the
Mediterranean.
When the four groups of factors that encourage discarding, i.e. institutional,
biological, technological and economical, are combined, the main issues to address
are (i) that certain stocks cause a choke species situation for some fleets; (ii) landings
of small or damaged fish, which have low market values; and (iii) illegal high-
grading as a consequence of the two former issues when vessel operators seek to
maximise their profits. Consequently, it is important to improve catch selectivity
through gear changes, changes to fishing patterns and effort reallocation and to apply
management measures that decrease effects of choke situations, such as enabling
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quotas to be traded or reallocated. Finally, the use of price measures (deemed value)
that consider the differences between market prices and the social value of the fish
should be considered to reduce the relative benefits of high-grading (Pascoe 1997).
In the short term, when fleet structure has not adapted to the new situation, the
introduction of the LO will generally result in decreasing profits for all selected fleets
mainly because of choke situations constraining the catch of other species in
TAC-regulated fisheries and because of lower catches of higher-value larger fish
given the requirement to land undersize fish in MCRS-regulated fisheries. Obvi-
ously, this is of concern for vessel operators, who see the risk that their economic
performance will deteriorate.
In the long term, economic repercussions will differ as the four factors mentioned
above interact in different ways for each fishery and the type of management affects
the options for businesses to adjust. In the Mediterranean, which is managed with
MCRS and has a wide variety of species, the main anticipated issue is the cost of
dealing with undersized fish which cannot be sold for human consumption and for
which there is a lack of processing facilities to make it into fishmeal or other
non-food products. This issue also applies to the northern fisheries, but here the
choke issue also plays a role. Countries that have tradable quota systems, such as
Denmark and the UK, can, to some degree, avoid or delay choke situations through
quota trade. While trading is possible however, there are no mechanisms to ensure or
require trading of quota units to mitigate choke situations. The choke issue could be
more severe for stocks managed by non-transferable quota shares such as in France
and Spain. Although long-term profits are expected to increase, some vessel busi-
nesses may not have the financial resources to overcome the severe economic losses
predicted during the first years of implementation. Some governments might find it
appropriate to implement measures to ensure that businesses do not fail as a result of
short-term impacts of a fully implemented Landing Obligation.
What defines the short and long term depends on the individual fisheries and how
fast these are able to adjust to the new situation. It must be expected that the fleet
structure will have adapted in ~10 years for most of the analysed fishing fleets, which
is why it has been chosen to monitor the results in 2025 in the present context.
Mitigation strategies such as selectivity changes, de minimis exemptions and
quota adjustments equal to previous discarded quantities could enable fishing busi-
nesses to increase profits with the implementation of the LO. But for the fisheries
analysed in this chapter, the profits are generally lower than or equal to profit with no
LO. For the North East Atlantic fisheries, regulated with TACs and quotas, a useful
policy could be to further develop a system to mitigate the problem of choke stocks.
Such a policy is already in place in the EU (cf. Frost 2010) through the annual setting
of TACs, when single-species assessments show recommended total removals that
are adjusted to take account of multispecies interactions and fleets’ technological
characteristics. Reducing differences between stock TACs and fleets’ catch compo-
sitions could mitigate the choke problem and allow individuals, producer organisa-
tions or fleet segments to land and sell fish and decrease the inherent incentive to
discard. However, this approach would also to some extent negate the purpose of the
Landing Obligation, which is to encourage more selective fishing by creating
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incentives to avoid catching species with lower quotas. To create incentives to avoid
catching fish below MCRS, price measures could be used to correct the difference
between the sale price and the estimated social value of the fish. The difference must
be sufficient to cover handling costs of landing the fish, and thus create an incentive
to do so, but not high enough to incentivise targeting the fish beyond the quota, and
vice versa to reduce prices for fish species with unused quotas.
Generally, the modelled economic outcomes for the seven selected fisheries
under the LO suggest that fishing businesses may have incentives not to comply
with the LO. Monitoring and enforcement are generally considered to be currently
insufficient to motivate compliance. Therefore, high-grading and continuing to
discard will still be an issue that must be addressed. The success of the LO is likely
to require either larger investment in monitoring and enforcement or implementation
of policies that create incentives for compliance or at least weaken incentives for
non-compliance.
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